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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
.J. SEAL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 10171

TA YCO, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATE:MENT OF F.NGTS
This is a suit on an open account. The lower court entered judgment for the plaintiff-appellant for a reduced
amount because of an offset alllowed defendant respondent on a jury verdict. Appellant seeks to have the judgment altered to eliminate the offset amount.
Plaintiff's assignor, the American Brake Shoe Company, sold certain merchandise to the defendant during
1961 at' per the statement attached as Exhibit "A" to
plaintifft' cmnplaint (R. 2). Defendant's liability to
plaintiff for this mnount as prayed was not in dispute
and it was stipulated at pretrial that plaintiff should have
judgnwnt therefor except to the extent that defendant
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was entitled to offsets claimed through its predecessor
in interest, J. Verne Taylot, which would reduce or cancel out entirely plaintiff's claim depending on the total
amount of any offsets (R. 5, paragraph No.1).
At pretrial defendant asserted two offsets (R. 5, 6,
paragraphs No. 2 and No. 3). At trial the first was
abandoned (R. 55) and the case went to trial on the second
only, which was an alleged loss of profits suffered by
defendant's predecessor in interest from an alleged
breach of contract in failing to deliver certain track
shoes for heavy construction equipment which defendant's predecessor ordered from plaintiff's assignor in
January, 19·57.
On January 25, 1957, the American Brake Shoes in
response to Mr. Taylor's request submitted to him a quotation of prices which provided, inter alia:
"FOR HD·-20 .A:C TR.A:CTOR
240 pes.

AMSCO Manganese Steel Track $34.6-5jlOO#
Shoe 24" Wide, with straight, for resale
high, grouser *266466, Dwg. CB- less 20%
30204 Wt. 62~# each.

240 pes.

AMSCO Manganese Steel Track $34.G5j100#
Shoe 26" Wide, with straight, for resale
high, grouser *308297, Dwg. CB- less 20%
30594 Wt. 70# each.
We do not own any patterns for
the HD-20 A.C. T·ractor in the
non-skid (corrugated or wave)
type, but could make them if this
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type is required but then the price
would be $44.00 jlOO# less 20% for
resale."
(E.XHIBIT 2)
It also had the date "April15" typed in on the blank provided in the following printed statement:
"SHIPMENT ·····--------------- after receipt of formal
order or necessary pattern equipment. Please include complete shipping instructions with your
order, whenever possible."
It expressly stated that it was subject to Conditions
of Sale specified on the reverse side, which provided
inter alia:

"1. CONDITIONS
(a) No terms and conditions contained in
any order placed with seller, other than those
herein and no agreement or other understanding
in any way modifying the terms and conditions
herein shall be binding on seller unless hereafter
made in writing and signed by its authorized representative.

* * *
"4. DELIVERY
(a) Dates quoted herein are approximate
and are based upon prompt receipt of all necessary inforn1ation.
(b) All sales are f.o.b. seller's plant, Chicago
Heights, Illinois, unless otherwise specified.
Claims for loss or damage in transit must be filed
by buyer. Seller will, however, assist whenever
possible, in all such claims.
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(c) Seller shall not be liable for any delays
or defaults, hereunder by reason of fire, floods,
acts of God, labor troubles, inability to secure
raw materials, acts of government or other causes
beyond its reasonable control. In the event of any
such delay, the date of delivery shall be extended
for a period equal to the time lost by reason of
the delay. In no event shall seller be liable for
special or consequential damages.

• * *
"6. CANCELLATIONS
Cancellations of orders may be made only by
mutual consent."
On January 30, 1957, a contractor in Idaho placed
an order with Mr. Taylor for equipment of the type
quoted by American Brake Shoe Company (EXHIBIT
1). On January 31, 19·57, Mr. Taylor sent his purchase order No. 7144 to the American Manganese Steel Division,
a branch of the American Brake Shoe Company, for the
purchase of 240 non skid off-set manganese shoes for
HD-20 Allis-Chalmers Tractors (EXHIBIT 3). On February 6, 1957, seller sent buyer the following letter which
was a printed form except for the word in italics which
were typewritten :
"Gentlemen:
Thank you kindly for your purchase order No.
7144 which, in order to expedite delivery of the
castings, has been split up for production at the
following plants:
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Castings being produced at
Item No.
Article
The above order has been transferred to our Oakland plant for production.
.
"Within the course of the next few days, you will
receive formal acknowledgment from each of the
foundries 1nentioned above, and at the same time,
will receive information concerning shipment of
the material.
Yours very truly,
AMERICAN MANGANESE
STEEL D·IVISION
By W. E. Broscombe, Jr."
(E.XHIBIT 7)
On February 22, 1957, the Oakland Foundry of seller
advised the buyer its order was ''now being filled in accordance with our standard Condition of Sale or Contract
with you. Our Foundry order F·57 -165 has been assigned
to it. Shipment is scheduled % April, 1957, % May,
U)5 7." (EXHIBIT 8). On March 2, 1957, buyer wrote
letter to seller's Oakland, California, foundry which
stated, inter alia:
"It is necessary to determine two items in this
letter. First, the card received from Mr . .Spangenberg on Feb. 22 about the above order. This order
was accepted by us for delivery not later than
the 2nd week in April 19517 based on authority of
~Ir. Dantiko and this delivery was by our custonler specified as being very necessary. Hence,
your card which specified lj2 of the order would
shipped in April and % in May absolutely dismayed us.
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"Will you please advance your schedule to
meet the promised quotation given us by Mr. Dantiko by air maillj23j57, quotation No. 125-I-187,
this was specified as sure of delivery by April15,
1957. Order placed on this basis.

* * *
"Thank you for your fine cooperation in the
past, and trusting that compliance with these letter
requests will be graciously made." (EXHIBIT 5)
On April 10, 1957, the Idaho contractor referred to
above wired a cancellation or his order to Mr. Taylor
(EXHIBIT 4) and Mr. Taylor immediately cancelled his
order with the American Brake Shoe Company (R. 58).
On May 4, 1957, Mr. Taylor wrote to seller's Oakland
Foundry as follows:
"American Manganese Steel Div.
850 Ferry Street
Oakland, California
Mr. Ed. Welsh, Western Sales Mgr.
Dear Ed:
"This letter is to acquaint you with the situation
at Palisades. We contacted the boys there and
they say they are not in a position to take the
26" shoes which they ordered and then cancelled,
their #56-2150, our order #7144.
"Because of our warehousing situation, we would
not like to take any shoes to warehouse at the
present, but when we are able to move some of
the three sets we still have, the picture may
change appreciably.
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"Please therefore, in accordance with our previou~ telephone conversation cancel our order
#7144 for Palisades Contractors.
"'vVe shall go to work on sale of those shoes and

some additional ones to make your work to the
present profitable, both for ourselves and for
you folks. You might, by return mail, advise
how 1nuch of a change in the 26" pattern would
be required to 1nake 24" shoes, for I had a very
interesting conversation about 24" shoes the
other day.
"How soon might we expect the return of the
20" and 22" shoes which you are preparing for us
and advise if you have either of these patterns
in your stock for we could use 8 more of the 20"
shoes this pattern to complete our set. If you do
not have this pattern I will order same from
'Chicago Heights as soon as you advise me. THIS
IS NOT AN ORDER FOR 8."
Very truly yours,
TAYLOR M. & S COMPANY
J. Verne Taylor, Manager"
(E,XIDBIT 9)
Thereafter the buyer "considered I had cancelled it and
I didn't do any n1ore about it." (R. 59). During the period
following April10, 1957, the American Brake Shoe Company had a local resident agent, Mr. Charles Bauman,
who lived in Salt Lake City until March of 1959, who
saw "Jfr. Taylor at least once per month (R. 64, R. 67).
Plaintiff nwved for a directed verdict at the close
of thP trial of this cause on four grounds (R. 40). This
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motion was denied and the jury returned a verdict allowing defendant an offset of $2,590.00 (R. 27) which
then resulted in a net verdict of $99·4.42 and judgment was
entered on this net verdict plus interest thereon since
December 14, 1961 (R. 28). Plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and if denied to correct
a miscalculation of the offset amount and the Court
denied both n1otions (R. 77). Plaintiff appeals from the
judgment entered because of errors in these rulings of
the trial court.

POINT I
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROVIDED THAT UNDER
NO CIR<CUMSTANCES SHOULD THE SELLER BE LIABLE
FOR SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE1S AND THE
DAMAGES ASSERTED BY BUYER IN THIS CASE WERE
SPECIAL AND NOT GENERAL DAMAGES SO THE COURT
ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO ASSEiS'S SPEeiAL
DAMAGES AS AN OFFSET.

As to the exculpatory provision of Paragraph 4( c) of
the Conditions of Sale of Exhibit 2, the Trial Court held,
after first instructing the jury to the contrary, that the
elimination of liability for special damages would be
restricted to those particular circumstances that would
absolve seller from responsibility for any damages (R.
74). It is appellant's contention, however, that the first
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stmtt>net- of that paragraph refers to both special and
g~neral drunages so no liability of any sort could be
m;~t-rtt~d by the buyPr if any of those conditions existed
(appellant never contended that they were applicable
in thi~ case), whereas the seller would be liable for gent·rnl but not for special damages if none of such condition~ were involved. Any other construction would give
no meaning whatsoever to the last sentence and would
therefore violate the rule of construction that all terms
of a contract will be harmonized to give meaning to all
of them if this can be done without violence to the intention of the parties. Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 236
{a). It would be more certain if the provisions regarding
special damages and general damages were in separate
paragraphs but to make that consideration controlling
would be to exalt form over substance and give undue
wPight to a minor difference in form, especially when
the words in question were words of art and should be
given their technical meaning. Restatement of Contracts,
Sec. 235 (b).

In the case of Eastern Brass & Copper Company,
lnc. l'. General Electric Supply Corporation, 101 F. Supp.
410, the District Court for the Southern District of New
I ork had a very similar question presented under an
exculpatory provision nearly identical to the one at bar.
In that case the exculpatory provisions were:
'''Ye shall not be liable for delays resulting
fron1 causes beyond our reasonable control or
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caused by fire, labor difficulties, or delays in our
usual sources of supply."
And then further :
"We shall not, under any circumstances, be
liable for special or consequential damages on
account of delay."
In that case the court held that the words "special or
consequential damages" as used in provisions of a contract for sale of electrical equipment that seller should
not under any circumstances be liable for"special or consequential" damages on account of delay were used in contradiction to "general or direct" damages. There the
court denied the seller's motion for a summary judgment
because some elements of plaintiff's complaint alleged
damages which were general rather than special and held
that general but not special damages could be recovered
despite the provision quoted above. That case was also
very similar in that the contract there, as here, eliminated
any claim for damages under certain specified conditions
of the type which were excluded in this seller's contract.
It is to be noted that the court there was not concerned
as to the cause of the delay since no mention was made
as to the reasons for the delay, hence it read the latter
provisions excluding special liability without reference
to the earlier provision which excluded liability of any
type. It is respectfully submitted that the trial court in
this case sought to apply the rule of ejusdem generis to a
situation where it is not applicable since the seller's liability for special damages is to be determined from the
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laHt Ht•ntetwP of paragraph 4( c) of Exhibit 2 and not from
the t'irt:it sentence of that paragraph.
To the smne effect is the holding in the case of
.:lRillCO Steel Corporation v. Ford Construction Company,
Ark.
372 SW2 630, which held that a contract
which provided that in no event should seller be liable for
eonsequential damages did not include direct or foret:iPt•able damages and that damages for breach of an implied warranty of quality were direct and not consequential.
In this case the buyer made no claim for general
damages and its offset was clearly based on special damages only as appears in the Jury Instructions No. 3 (R.
70, 71). To allow the jury to grant an offset based on
special da1nages is to contravene the terms of the contract in question and to rewrite the contract for the parties which constitutes error.
POINT II
THE CONTRA:CT OF SALE BE'TWEEN AMERICAN
BRAKE SHOE COMPANY
AND J. VERNE TAYI.;OR PROVIDED THAT THE TRA:CK
SHOES IN QUESTION SHOULD BE DELIVERED ONE-HALF
IN APRIL, 1957, AND ONE-HALF IN MAY, 1957, SO THERE
WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT WHEN THE BUYER
CANCELLED HIS ORDER ON APRIL 10, 1957, AND IT WAS
THEREFORE ERROR TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT.

The buyer's order of January 31, 1957 (EXHIBIT
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3) could not have constituted an acceptance of an· offer
to sell by seller since the latter expressly made orders
based on its price quotation subject to home office acceptance (EXHIBIT 2). Such a quotation as EXHIBIT 2 is
not an offer under the rule of Sec. 25 of the R-estatement of Contracts, which provides:
"WHEN A MANIFESTATION OF INTEN~TION IS NOT AN OFFER
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from the circumstances existing at the
time, the person to whom the promise or manifestation is addressed knows or has reason to
know that the person making it does not intend it
as an expression of his fixed purpose until he
has given a future expression of assent, he has
not made an offer."
Also, an acceptance to be legally effective must be for
the identical terms and conditions of the offer. In 17
CJS, 674, Contracts, Sec. 42, it is stated:
"'The rule, as stated in Corpus Juris, which
has been quoted and cited with approval, is that
the offeror has a right to prescribe in his offer
any conditions as to time, place, quantity, mode of
acceptance or other matters which it may please
him to insert in and make a part thereof, and the
acceptance, to conclude the agreement, must in
every respect meet and correspond with the offer,
neither falling short or, nor going beyond the
terms proposed but exactly meeting them at all
points and closing with them just as they stand
and, in the absence of such an acceptance, subse-
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qurnt words or acts of the parties cannot create
a contract."
In R. J. DaunL Canst. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 747
817, See. 73 of Williston on Contracts, Revised Editioll, wm; quoted in part as follows:

P~

". . . and if any provision is added to which
the offeror did not assent, the consequence is not
merely that this provision is not binding and that
no contract is formed, but the offer is rejected."
That case held that no contract was entered into when
the acceptance did not include an extra price contained
in the subcontractor's offer even though the extra price
provision later became moot due to the terms of the
princpal contract. In this case, however, Mr. Taylor specified shipment on April 1, 1957, whereas the quotation
of January 25, 1957, was for shipment approximately on
April 15, 1957. (The reference to two weeks after April
1, 1957, refers not to the order in question but as to the
buyer's transaction with his purchaser.) Thus no contract was entered into until seller's conditional acceptance
of buyer's order on February 6, 1957, which expressly
provided that the shipment time would be specified by
the foundry filling the order (EXHIBIT 7) and the latter
specified one-half in April, 1957, and one-half in May,
Hl51 (EXHIBIT 8). Buyer's letter of March 2, 1957,
EXHIBIT 5) recognized the terms of acceptance by
St'ller but requested an advance of its schedule to satisfy
buyer's customer. Legally, therefore, the contract terms
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were for delivery one-half in April, 1957, and one-half in
May, 1957, or there was no contract. Thus no breach of
contract could have occurred by April 10, 1957, when
buyer cancelled his order (R. 58). Without a breach of
contract, any offset to plaintiff's claim would be erroneous and should be reversed. The question as to whether
seller's quotation of January 25, 1957, (EXHIBIT 2) was
an offer or an invitation to make an offer, an issue raised
by plaintiff in the pre-trial order (R. 6, paragraph No.4)
would be a question of law for the trial court and not a
question of fact for the jury. The court treated it as an
offer and plaintiff subn1its this was erroneous.

POIN'r III
THE PARTIES 'TO THE 1957 CONTRACT OF SALE CANCELLED IT BY MUTUAL CONSENT AFTER ANY CLAIM BY
BUYER FOR DAMAGES AROSE SO AS A MATTER OF LAW
'THE DE'FENDANT HAD NO VALID OFFSET ARISING
FRiOM ANY BRE.NCH THEREOF BY XHE SELLER, AND
IT WAS THERE FORE ERRiOR FOR THE COURT TO DENY
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON
THIS GROUND.
1

Here it is undisputed that Mr. Taylor asked the
A1nerican Brake Shoe Company to cancel the order on
which respondent's offset was based and that the American Brake Shoe Company did so and never billed him
for the 100 track shoes it made at his request. It is also
undisputed that neither Mr. Taylor nor the respondent
ever took any action to assert the claim upon which this
offset was based until it was raised as defense to this
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suit despite monthly contact with seller'~ representative
for ovPr :t~ 1nonths (R. 64, 67). In fact, neither the re:-;pondent nor .Mr. Taylor even had the original quotation
from the s~ller when this case was tried. (Appellant produet>d a eopy of it for trial pursuant to respondent's request, H. -!3, 44). It stretches one's credulity beyond the
breaking point to imagine that even Mr. Taylor could
believe he had a justifiable claim against American Brake
Shoe Company in view of his own actions in 19'57 and compi Ph' silence concerning it for over six years. There was
no Pvidence from which the jury could find that the contract of sale existed after May 4, 1957, so there was no
qtwstion of fact concerning that point and the jury should
have been directed accordingly. Even if there was no
mutual rescission as a matter of law, it would be most
unfair to allow a buyer to induce a seller to believe that
a contract was rescinded and so allow the statute of limitations to bar any claim it had under a contract and then
to permit the buyer, as here, to assert rights under it in
defense to a bill he incurred thereafter and failed to pay.
.-\.11 the eletnents of, and reasons for the policy which give
rise to, the doctrine of estoppel are here present and
should be invoked to prevent respondent from denying
a mutual rescission of the 1957 contract even if no mutual
rescission in fact occurred.

The statement in Hartwell v. Minneapolis-Moline
Power Implement Company, 117 Colorado 291, 186 P. 2d
:.?:.?S, that
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"A party to a contract can not treat it as
binding and rescind it at the same time."
should apply equally under the facts of this case.

POINT IV
THE BUYER WAS UNDER A DUTY TO MITIGATE
DAMAGES RE'SUUTING FROM ANY BREACH OF CONTRA1CT BY SELLER, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
THAT THE BUYER .A:TT'EMPTED TO OBTAIN FOR HIS
PURCHASER ·THE 'l''RAGK SHOES IN QUESTION BY APRIL
15, 1957, WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT ON FgBRUARY 22,
1957, THAT DELIVERY OF PART OF THE ORDER WOULD
NOT BE MADE UNTIL MAY, 1957, OR THAT IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO AGQUIRE THEM FROM ANY OTHER
SOURJCE BY THE REQUIRED DATE TO EF·FEGT THE RESALE.

An injured party to a contract should minimize or
even eliminate the damages he suffers as a result of a
breach of contract and no recovery is allowed for special
damages if the buyer fails to obtain substitute goods in
time to consummate a resale of them. Restatement of
Contracts, Sec. 336. State of Delaware v. Massachusetts
Bo11Ading & Insurance Company (Delaware) 49 F. Supp.
467. The rule is stated in 46 Am. Juris. 812, Sales Sec.
683 as follows :
"The fact that a reasonable substitute may
be obtained in the market materially affects the
question of damages and 1nay even limit the recovery to the difference between the agreed price
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and what the article or commodity reasonably
answering the purpose would have cost."
l.n this case the evidence is entirely devoid of any
proof that l\lr. Taylor took any efforts to meet this duty
or ever made any inquiries to ascertain whether it was
impossible to obtain a substitute product when he became
aware on February 22, 19·57, that the American Brake
Shoe Company was not scheduling delivery in time to
meet his customer's delivery date. The fact that the
cancellation was made as late as April 10, 1957, for an
imperative need to be filled April15, 19·57, demonstrates
that the ultin1ate customer was able to meet his needs in
a very short time from a competing product hence it was
possible to mitigate any damages in this case. At least
a court can not properly assume that this manufactureT
was the only one who could make this product or make
it within the required time or that Mr. T·aylor had exl'reised reasonable diligence in ascertaining this but inadYPrtently failed to present proof of it. To allow special
damages to stand under such circumstances is to eliminate thP wise requirement and policy of the law to require damages to be lessened as much as is reasonably
possible.

POINr V
TIME WAS NOT OF THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONTRACT AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE
SELLER WAS AWARE ON JANUARY 31, 1957, THA:T' 8PECIAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF THE OFFSET AL-
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LOWED BY THE OOUR,T WOULD OCCUR IF THE ORDER
WAS NOT DELIVEREn BY APRIL 15, 1957, AND IT WAS
ERROR THEREFORE TO ALLOW SUCH ~SIPECIAL DAM-

The contract in question did not expressly state that
time was of the essence and the seller had no reason to
believe that without strict performance with respect to
time that the contract of sale would not accomplish its
purpose.
In such circumstances the modern rule is that time
is not of the essence. 17A C.J.S. 789, Contracts Sec. 504
(1). In the case of I-XL Eastern Furniture Comparvy
v. Holly Hill Lumber Co. (D.S.C., 1955), 134 F. Supp.
343, the court declared:

"Courts are reluctant to hold that time is of
the essence in contracts for manufacture and sale
of non-existent goods, particularly when the goods
are made to special order and are of a kind not
readily saleable in the general market."

The Court properly instructed the jury that special
damages could be alllowed only to the extent that the jury
found from the evidence such damages was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract by reason
of a lmowledge of the special facts and circumstances
from which such special damages would arise (R. 70, 71,
Instruction No. 4).

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

In this ease the evidence showed only that the seller
knew that the track shoes in question were being purt•ha~t~d to fulfill an order the buyer had from his customer
who had ~pecified a delivery by April15, 19'57. 'There is
no evidence in the record that the seller knew the terms
of the buyer's resale. It may be presumed they contemplated a 20% profit since their quotation was based
on a discount of that an1ount "for resale." That amount
would be $1,164.00 according to the price of $34.65 per
hundred weight according to the price on which the jury
assessed the offset (20% of $34.65 x .70 x 240) or $1,558
if the price of $44.00 per hundred weight which appellant contends would be applicable is used. Likewise, there
is no intilnation at all in the evidence that the seller knew
or had any reason to know that the buyer's customer
would cancel the order if delivery was not to be made
t>xaetly as specified. There was no evidence from which
it could be inferred that delay to the delivery date intended by the .AJ.nerican Brake Shoe Company would be
so critical as to amount to a failure of consideration on
the buyer's contract with that customer and it is inconsistent for the buyer in such situation to insist on
holding his seller and releasing his buyer after both purchasers cancelled their orders. The actual loss to the
~-imerican Brake Shoe Company of manufacturing a custom product for which it then had no sale no doubt exeeeded by a considerable mnount the actual loss sustained
by :Jir. Taylor. At least the loss to that company ought
not to be increased at the price of Mr. Taylor's generosity
in not holding his customer to his contract. The lesser
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amount Mr. Taylor would realize on that sale after deducting the losses that Palisade 'Contractors would have
sustained in getting half of subject product up to 15 days
later than specified and the other half between 15 and 45
days beyond that time would normally be considerable
less than the profit .American Brake Shoe had in this
production and the latter would undoubtedly have preferred to adjust its price to that extent so as to lose much
less than as occurred here.

POINT VI
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD JUSTIFY
THE JURY IN ALDOWING AN OFFSET IN EXCE,SS OF
$1,694.40, AND rr WAS THEREFORE ERROR FOR THE
COURT TO ALLOW A VERDICT OF $2,5'90.00 'TO STAND IN
SPITE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REDUCTION TO
THE LE'SSER AMOUNT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

As will be seen from the price quotation of American
Brake Shoe Company (EXHIBIT 2), the price of the
non-skid type shoe, the type applicable in this case
(EXHIBIT'S 3 and 1), would be $44.00 per hundred
weight rather than $34.65 per hundred weight for the
other two types of different size and weights as set forth
in that quotation. There is no evidence whatsoever that
the price for the non-skid type was to be less than $44.00
per hundred weight no matter what width or weight was
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ot·dPrTd. Hence the jury's verdict in accepting the computatiom; of respondent's counsel ($31.70 x 240 less
$:1-Uir> x. .70 x ~+0 less 20% = $2,799.84) with some unexplained cOinpensating adjustn1ent finds no support in
the (•vidence and Inust be adjusted in accordance with
Uw proof. If any offset is allowed at all, it must be
computed as follows: $31.70 x 240 less $44.00 x .70 x
~-1-0 less 20% of the last figure, which would amount to
$l,ti94.50, the same figure except for lOc given in respondPnt's motion to correct the judgment (R 77).

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion
for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the case and
in not entering a judgment for plaintiff as prayed notwithstanding the verdict in accordance with plaintiff's
motion after the verdict was returned because any contract entered into by the parties which involved the
disputed offset was not breached by plaintiff's assignor
with respect to the delivery date (Point II above),
because the contract between them expressly excluded
any liability for such special damages as involved here
(Point I), because the contract of sale was rescinded
by mutual consent after any liability under it arose
(Point III), because no special damages were in the
contemplation of the parties to the contract at that time
(Point Y), because the buyer here made no attempt to
mitigate or eliminate any special damages (Point IV)
or for any of said reasons.
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Even if an offset is allowed because none of the
above points have merit, the maxinnun offset allowable
under the evidence would be $1,694.40 (Point VI), and
in that event the judgment should be for the sum of
$1,790.62 plus interest on that sUln since December 11,
1961.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSEN & SUM8ION
65 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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